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for Variational DerivativesI
Ivahn Smadja
Universite´ Paris Diderot - Paris 7 - CNRS UMR 7219
Abstract
This paper sets out to show how Eddington’s early twenties case for variational derivatives
significantly bears witness to a steady and consistent shift in focus from a resolute striv-
ing for objectivity towards “selective subjectivism” and structuralism. While framing
his so-called “Hamiltonian derivatives” along the lines of previously available variational
methods allowing to derive gravitational field equations from an action principle, Edding-
ton assigned them a theoretical function of his own devising in The Mathematical Theory
of Relativity (1923). I make clear that two stages should be marked out in Eddington’s
train of thought if the meaning of such variational derivatives is to be adequately assessed.
As far as they were originally intended to embody the mind’s collusion with nature by
linking atomicity of matter with atomicity of action, variational derivatives were at first
assigned a dual role requiring of them not only to express mind’s craving for permanence
but also to tune up mind’s privileged pattern to “Nature’s own idea”. Whereas at a
later stage, as affine field theory would provide a framework for world-building, such
“Hamiltonian differentiation” would grow out of tune through gauge-invariance and, by
disregarding how mathematical theory might precisely come into contact with actual
world, would be turned into a mere heuristic device for structural knowledge.
Key words: general relativity, Hamilton’s principle, action, gauge invariance,
structuralism, Eddington, Einstein, Hilbert, Weyl
1. Introduction
Eddington’s philosophical train of thought in the twenties may be outlined as a steady
and consistent shift in focus from a resolute striving for objectivity towards “selective
subjectivism” and structuralism. As a consequence of the identification of phenomeno-
logical matter with a well-behaved tensor, pattern recognition would appear as taking
precedence over knowledge of the external world as such, inasmuch as the mind would
allegedly single out a specific pattern as permanent substance. While addressing the
challenging issue whether the unified scheme in which the laws of physics had been so
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far successfully woven would wholly stem from the mind, as his current views seemed to
suggest strongly in the early twenties, Eddington however inclined to admit that “there
are laws which appear to have seat in external nature”1 and to acknowledge the law of
atomicity as probably the only genuine law of nature. Since matter happens to exist
only in certain lumps corresponding to atoms or electrons, the inescapable question, as
eloquently raised by Eddington, would thus be : “whence arises this discontinuity?”2.
Insofar as the mind mostly endeavours to “smooth the discontinuities of nature into con-
tinuous perception”3, there is little plausibility in ascribing atomicity of matter to the
workings of the mind, so that the cause thereof might rather be something in the nature
of things themselves, whereas the analysis into point-events might not be ultimate. Sup-
posing that a further analysis could delve deeper into the atomic structure of matter so
that something still more fundamental could be attained, laws of nature such as atomic-
ity would eventually be accounted for as identities. But, as Eddington points out, “this
more ultimate analysis stands on a different plane from that by which the point-events
were reached”4. How then could these two different scales, namely molecular structure
of matter versus continuous structure of matter, could be brought into one single, even
if provisional, scheme ? Eddington suggests some kind of trade-off between microscopic
and macroscopic levels of reality. Though, strictly speaking, the regions lying between
the electrons in which matter is scattered are not to be thought of as curved, while the
regions inside the electrons should be held outright cut out of space-time, all that is re-
quired in macroscopic physics is to know “not the actual values of the g’s at a point, but
their average values through a region, (. . . ) [so that ] uncurved space-time studded with
holes is replaced by an equivalent fully curved space-time without holes”5. Though gen-
eralizing previously well-known variational techniques allowing to derive field equations
from an action principle, Eddington originally devised his “Hamiltonian derivatives”6 as
the appropriate mathematical apparatus allowing to implement this equivalence by con-
ciliating apparently contradictory requirements. Both molecular and continuous schemes
should indeed be conjoined, though kept distinct, as embodying part of the physical truth,
since the space-time interval can be seen as “an average summary which suffices for our
coarse methods of investigation and holds true [even if ] only statistically”7, so that, as
Eddington avers, it is preferable to think of matter and energy, “not as agents causing
the degrees of curvature of the world, but as parts of our perceptions of the existence of
the curvature”8.
1[8, p. 199].
2[8, p. 199].
3[8, p. 199].
4[8, p. 199].
5[8, p. 92].
6By “Hamiltonian derivatives”, Eddington, who most likely coined the term, meant the variation of
the action integral of the gravitational Lagrangian, based on a suitable scalar density, with respect to
the metric, at least at a first stage of his working out the notion. Though such significant figures of the
period as for instance Schro¨dinger, adopted Eddington’s terminology, it never came to be recognized as
standard in the general relativity literature, and has now grown mostly extinct though [22] still uses
it, as [4] had done before. Anyway, one should be aware that in the current scientific literature on
quantum field theory, quantum and molecular chemistry, something else is meant by the term, namely
the derivatives of a system’s Hamiltonian with respect to the canonical coordinates.
7[8, p. 92], my emphasis.
8[8, p. 92].
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So as to make clear why Eddington may have been led to envision “Hamiltonian
differentiation” as a way out of the predicament consisting in such alternative levels of
physical reality being apparently irreconcilable, it may prove useful to outline the ani-
mated debate that opposed, a few years before Eddington’s own attempts, some of the
main protagonists engaged in the pursuit of a unified field theory, concerning whether,
how and to what extent a variational derivation of gravitational field equations should
be deemed effective and legitimate. As is well known, Hilbert and Einstein arrived at
gravitational field equations by two different routes though both eventually agreeing on
a common standard formulation during the dramatic weeks of November, 1915. The way
the interactions and exchanges that occurred between them in this short period of time
may have affected their respective approaches and somewhat deflected their ultimate
contributions has been extensively studied in the recent years (cf. [36], [33], [7], [37],
[27]). The timeline should be kept in mind here if a clear understanding of both posi-
tions is to be gained. From June 29 to July 7, 1915, Einstein visited Hilbert in Go¨ttingen
and, later commenting on this meeting, would state that he “he had the great pleasure of
seeing that everything [meaning presumably, as explained by [7, p. 321], the equivalence
of inertial and gravitational effects as being susceptible of an expression in terms of the
metric tensor ] was understood down to the details”9. A few months later, on the base of
previous work on the structure of matter, Hilbert presented two communications on “the
foundations of physics” in Go¨ttingen circles, first on November 16, then four days later
on November 20, 1915. Though invited to attend these events, Einstein declined since at
the same time he was working hard on the correct computation of the perihelion advance
of Mercury as predicted by his new field equations. Extant galley proofs of Hilbert’s
Go¨ttingen presentation, dated December 6, 1915, bearing the author’s handwritten an-
notation “Erste Korrektur meiner ersten Note”, have been carefully compared to the
published version, viz. [23], dated March 16, 1916. Though incomplete, these proofs
help figuring out how Hilbert’s line of thought evolved during these crucial months from
a derivation of the yet correct gravitational field equations of general relativity - though
very likely (since the decisive passage in this respect is missing) only in implicit form
- in terms of a variational principle applied to a Lagrangian conceived as a sum of a
gravitational part and a matter part on the one hand, to an ultimate incorporation and
homologation of Einstein’s tensor within his own peculiar scheme in the printed version
on the other hand (cf. [37]). In the meantime, Einstein who had struggled to master gen-
eral covariance after having disposed of the objection relating to the “hole argument” that
had blocked him during the previous months10, gave a series of four communications to
the Berlin Academy culminating on November 25, 1915, with the presentation of the
final version of his generally covariant gravitational field equations. On the base of his
hearing about Hilbert’s Go¨ttingen talks, Einstein would complain, without though nam-
ing anyone, in a oft-quoted letter to Zangger11, dated November 26, 1915, about some
attempts aiming at “nostrifying”12 his theory. However intricate such crossed influences
9Einstein to Sommerfeld, July 15, 1915, [18, Doc. 96], our emphasis
10As pointed out by [7, p. 347], Einstein eventually put aside the “hole argument” by convincing
himself that “nothing is real physically except for the entirety of the spatio-temporal point coincidences”
(Einstein to Besso, January 3, 1916, [18, Doc. 178], Italics in the original).
11[18, Doc. 152].
12Cf. [7, p. 419-422] for an explanation of what “nostrification” as a key feature of Go¨ttingen culture,
means.
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may have been, one major difference between Hilbert’s and Einstein’s view of the way
gravitational field equations should be obtained remains of concern if Eddington’s later
work is to be correctly assessed, namely their disagreement on the status and the role of
variational methods.
Hilbert favoured an axiomatic approach to the foundations of physics by which he
meant a grand theory concerning physics in general that would mainly solve the problem
of the structure of matter which had been his longstanding central focus of interest and
with respect to which gravitational field equations only appeared as a secondary and
almost incidental goal. More specifically, Hilbert’s 1915 axiomatization of physics aimed
at combining in a broad integrated whole Mie’s electromagnetic theory of matter with
some of the ideas Einstein had presented in Go¨ttingen during the previous summer term,
essentially the principle of equivalence and general covariance. Mie’s 1912 theory ([28])
set out to substantiate the view that the electron has no independent physical existence
apart from the ether, so that what is given to our perception as material particles would
be nothing more than singularities of the ether13. Whereas the field of a charged particle
would presumably grow infinite inside the particle according to Coulomb’s law, as [7]
explains, “Mie’s equations generalized those of Maxwell’s theory in such a way that the
repulsive forces predicted inside the electron would be compensated by other forces, of
purely electrical nature, as well. Moreover, outside the electron, the deviation of Mie’s
equations from Maxwell’s becomes undetectable”14. Inasmuch as he thought of electric
and gravitational actions as being derived from the very same forces that are assumed by
his theory of matter, Mie tried to develop new Lorentz covariant equations that would
account not only for the phenomena that take place between the material particles but
also for those that take place inside them.
Guided by what Klein would later stigmatize as a “fanatical”15 belief in the power of
variational methods as a means to disclose the hidden laws of nature, Hilbert conceived
of the axiomatization of any particular physical discipline as requiring that a general
variational argument be supplemented by specific axioms “meant to capture the essence
of the theory in question”16, and thus incorporated Mie’s theory of matter in the form
of such a variational principle as the central axiom of his own theory. Assuming a space-
time manifold with coordinates ws, s = 1, 2, 3, 4, Hilbert considers the ten gravitational
potentials gµν acknowledged as “first introduced by Einstein”17 and four electrodynamic
potentials qs which, unlike the former, though introduced on a equal footing with them,
lack any transparent geometrical interpretation and “appear in the theory as somewhat
external elements”18. The key idea is then to derive field equations by a variational
principle from a Hamiltonian function H, a “world-function”, of these gµν with their
13Cf. [7, p. 300] : “[according to Mie] the electric and the magnetic fields are present inside the
electron as well. This expresses the assumption that the electrons are an organic part of the ether,
rather than foreign elements added to it, as was the common belief among certain physicists at the
time. The electron is thus conceived as a non-sharply delimited, highly dense, nucleus in the ether that
extends continually and infinitely into an atmosphere of electrical charge. An atom is a concentration
of electrons, and the high intensity of the electric field around it is what should ultimately explain the
phenomenon of gravitation.”
14[7, p. 300].
15Klein to Pauli, May 8, 1921, quoted by [7, p. 436].
16[7, p. 333].
17[23, p. 395].
18[41, p. 57].
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first and second derivatives ∂gµν∂wl ,
∂2gµν
∂wl∂wk
, and the qs with their first derivatives
∂qq
∂wl
.
Whereas axiom I, viz. “Mie’s axiom of the world-function”, states that under infinitesimal
variations of the fourteen potentials gµν , qs, the variation of the action integral vanishes,
δ
∫
H
√
gdω = 0, (1)
axiom II, viz. “the axiom of general invariance”, ensures that H is invariant with re-
spect to any of the transformation of the coordinates ws. Among the Euler-Lagrange
equations yielded by the variational principle, Hilbert identifies those associated with
the variation of the gµν with the ten gravitational field equations and those associated
with the variation of the qs with the four electrodynamic ones, respectively denoted in
abbreviated form
[
√
gH]µν = 0, [
√
gH]h = 0. (2)
A mathematical theorem (viz. Theorem I) which Hilbert presented as the “Leitmotiv
for the construction of [the] theory”19 and which appears with hindsight as boiling down
to Noether’s second theorem, then presumably allowed for unification of gravitational
and electromagnetic fields, insofar as the original fourteen Euler-Lagrange equations
are proven to reduce to only ten independent ones. Hilbert thence claimed that “the
electrodynamic phenomena are an effect of gravitation”20 inasmuch as he erroneously
inferred that the electrodynamic equations [
√
gH]h = 0 were a mere consequence of the
gravitational ones [
√
gH]µν = 0, the latter being tacitly identified as a whole with the
independent equations. Though generally covariant and as such very much akin to the
equations Einstein obtained at about the same time, these gravitational field equations
did not yet constitute the fundamental equations of physics in Hilbert’s view, since
four supplementary non generally covariant energy equations were then required so as to
restore causality21. Within such an axiomatic setting, Hilbert still worked out the theory
further by postulating that the Hamiltonian function be of a certain form, namely that
it should be composed of a gravitational and an electromagnetic part
H = K + L (3)
where K is the scalar curvature whereas L remains unspecified besides being assumedly
dependent, for the sake of simplicity, on the sole gravitational potentials gµν and the
electrodynamic potential qs and their first derivatives
∂qq
∂wl
. The Euler-Lagrange equations
associated with the variation of the gµν then provide fine-grained gravitational field
equations
[
√
gK]µν +
∂
√
gL
∂gµν
= 0 (4)
19[23, p. 396].
20[23, p. 397].
21In this respect, Einstein and Hilbert went reverse ways, insofar as the former doggedly strove for
general covariance while not taking it for granted, whereas the latter was eventually led to counterbalance
the so-called “axiom of general invariance” by the need to guarantee determinism for the equations of
physics. Cf. [3] for an overall assessment of the epistemological significance of the axiomatic setting
in which Hilbert addressed the problem raised by the tension between general covariance on the one
hand, taken as a “an ideal regulative principle in the sense of Kant” ([3, p. 145]) which would condition
objectivity, and causality on the other hand, conceived of by contrast as “a necessary condition imposed
by the mind in structuring experience”([3, p. 146]).
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where the second term on the left-hand side obtained by taking the variation of the
metric tensor in the electromagnetic part of the action integral is none other than Mie’s
electromagnetic energy tensor, which, as Hilbert stressed it, “indicated [to him] the close
connection between Einstein’s general theory of relativity and Mie’s electrodynamics and
provided [him] with the conviction of the correctness of the theory developed here”22.
Still in the proofs of the November communication, the gravitational field equations only
appear in the implicit form given above (equ.(4)), whereas in the printed version, Hilbert
gave them an explicit formulation
[
√
gK]µν =
√
g
(
Kµν − 12Kgµν
)
(5)
which he claimed to follow “easily and without calculations”23 from the implicit form, by
simply pointing out that “Kµν is the only second rank tensor, besides gµν , and K is the
only invariant that can be made up only with the gµν and their first and second deriva-
tives gµνk , g
µν
kl .”
24 Though this justificatory argument seems to have played an important
role in the framing of the received gravitational field equations25 since both Einstein
and Hilbert used it, Eddington would later circumvent it by considering alternative La-
grangians giving rise to higher order gravitational field equations as equally acceptable
(Cf. §3.2 below). Whereas Einstein’s explicit articulation, occurring in the meantime,
of the gravitational field equations may have induced Hilbert in making them explicit
as well in his own later written version, thus gaining extra support from convergence
with Einstein’s formulation, Hilbert’s approach still remains utterly different from Ein-
stein’s and can be seen as the “culmination of a research program”26 whose main feature
consists in combining axiomatization and variational methods with deep concern for the
structure of matter, as the conclusion of the published version bears witness :
. . . not only our conceptions of space, time and motion have been modified in
the direction suggested by Einstein, but I am also convinced that starting from
the basic equations established here, the innermost - and so far concealed processes
occurring inside the atom will be finally illuminated.27
Einstein distanced himself from Hilbert’s view first by denying any alleged “close
connection” between his gravitational field equations and Mie’s theory of matter, and
second by pointing out a presumably important weakness from the physical point of view
in Hilbert’s derivation of such field equations from a variational principle :
22[23, p. 404]. Cf. [41, p. 59] for a comment on this passage.
23[23, p. 405].
24[23, p. 405].
25The history of this justificatory argument is outlined in [7, p. 359] : “It seems that this kind of
argument was first suggested by Grossmann to Einstein at the beginning of their collaboration. However,
it was not until 1917 that Klein raised doubts about its validity and, at any rate, he was not able to find
at that time any published proof of it. On Klein’s request, Hermann Vermeil (1889-1959) by then his
assistant, came up with a proof that, indeed, K is the only scalar invariant involving linear combinations
of gµν and its first and second derivatives. The proof itself was rather straightforward, but it required
some effort. Later on, additional proofs were given by Weyl and Laue who also showed their precise
connection with Einstein’s argument.”
26[7, p. 343].
27[23, p. 407], the translation is Leo Corry’s ([7, p. 343]) and the emphasis is mine.
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The difficulty was not in finding the generally covariant equations from the gµν ;
for this is easily achieved with the aid of the Riemann’s tensor. Rather, it was
hard to recognize that these equations are a generalization, that is, a simple and
natural generalization of Newton’s law. It has just been in the last few weeks that I
succeeded in this . . . whereas 3 years ago with my friend Grossmann, I had already
taken into consideration the only possible generally covariant equations, which have
now been shown to be the correct ones.28
Einstein did not dismiss Hamilton’s principle as such as an acceptable way to derive
field equations. Ever since [19], he had opted for a straightforward recourse to a varia-
tional derivation operating on an action integral akin to Hilbert’s29 and would later go
back to such methods ([15]) without though making any strong assumption on the con-
stitution of matter, as Hilbert did. Therefore what was incriminated in his criticism was
rather Hilbert’s failure to convincingly provide, through variational methods, an overall
encompassing theory of matter in the line of Mie, as he clearly articulated in a letter to
Weyl, dated November 23, 1916.
Hilbert’s assumption about matter appears childish to me, in the sense of a child
who does not know of any of the tricks of the world outside. I am searching in vain
for a physical indication that the Hamiltonian function for matter can be formed
from the φν ’s [viz. the electromagnetic potentials] without differentiation. At all
events, mixing the solid considerations originating from the relativity postulate
with such bold, unfounded hypotheses about the structure of the electron or matter
cannot be sanctioned. I gladly admit that the search for a suitable hypothesis, or
for the Hamiltonian function for the structural make-up of the electron, is one of
the most important tasks of theory today. The “axiomatic method” can be of little
use here, though.30
In about the same vein, Weyl would later emphasize “the maze of experimental facts
which the physicist has to take into account [being ] too manifold, their expansion too
fast, and their aspect and relative weight too changeable for the axiomatic method to
find a firm enough foothold, except in the thoroughly consolidated parts of our physical
knowledge”, thus favouring Einstein’s way of “grop[ing his] way in the dark” as more
appropriate to physical theory inasmuch as requiring “another type of experience and
imagination than those of the mathematician”31. More specifically, Weyl’s criticism
focused on Hilbert’s Hamiltonian function involving “still much too much arbitrariness
[which] subsequent attempts (by Weyl, Eddington, Einstein himself and others) aimed
to reduce”32. Whereas, by tracking down the last remnant of abstract empty thinking in
Riemannian geometry, Weyl’s own gauge fundamental concept (cf below §4.1) provided
28Einstein to Hilbert, November 18, 1915, [18, Doc. 148].
29In this respect, [7, p. 295-296] points out a significant fact indicating that Einstein may have
originally borrowed the very idea of a variational derivation of gravitational field equations from Hilbert’s
circle : “It is . . . remarkable that in a footnote to the article containing the variational derivation,
Grossmann and Einstein thanked Paul Bernays for having suggested this very possibility for obtaining
the equations. . . . one wonders to what extent this enthusiasm for variational methods was not a direct
result of the ever-present centrality of such techniques in the day-to-day routine of Hilbert and his circle.”
30Einstein to Weyl, November 23, 1916, [18, Doc. 278], emphasis in the original.
31[46, p. 653]
32[46, p. 654]
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an intertwining of gravitational and electromagnetic fields that would allegedly be more
in agreement with experimental facts than mere Go¨ttingen variational virtuosity, still
Weyl himself persistently claimed that “the whole of physical phenomena may be derived
from one single world-law of mathematical simplicity”33, namely from a suitable action
principle, whatever be the difficulties, stressed by [21], that were to be encountered so as
to find “a satisfactory Lagrangian from which the field equations of Weyl’s theory can be
derived”34. Reversely, by contrast with Einstein whose well-known objection to Weyl’s
theory did not prevent him though from deeming it a valuable attempt35, Hilbert would
later judge it rather harshly as ill-conceived immoderate idealizing for which he coined
the term “Hegelian physics”36, though claiming at the same time the paternity for most
of the building blocks that Weyl used :
Having returned from Bucharest I have looked more carefully at the proofs of
your book [viz. [43]] which gave me great pleasure, especially also the refreshing
and enthusiastic presentation. I noticed that you did not even mention my first
Go¨ttingen note from 1915 even though the foundations of the gravitational the-
ory, in particular the use of the Riemannian curvature in the Hamiltonian integral
which you present on page 191, stems from me alone, as does the separation of the
Hamiltonian function in H - L, the derivation of the Maxwellian equations, etc.
Also the whole presentation of Mie’s theory is precisely that which I gave for the
first time in my first note on the foundations of physics. For Einstein’s earlier work
on his definitive theory of gravitation appeared at the same time as mine (namely
in November 1915); Einstein’s other papers, in particular on electrodynamics and
on Hamilton’s principle appeared however much later.37
In this context, Eddington’s use of Hamilton’s principle so as to derive field equations
are to be demarcated from both Hilbert’s and Weyl’s, inasmuch as presumably tracing
a different path toward unified field theory38. As is well known, Eddington suggested
putting aside the metric as the fundamental concept and starting out right away with a
suitable connection in terms of which a so-called “affine geometry” can be framed out.
Unlike Weyl, Eddington hence distinguished this affine geometry as the “geometry of the
world structure” from Riemannian geometry as the “natural geometry of the world”, the
latter being “the single true geometry in the sense understood by the physicist” whereas
33[42, p. 385, footnote 4].
34[21, p. 35].
35Einstein indeed admired the “stroke of genius of first rank”([18, Vol. 8B, Doc. 498, 710]), whereas
decisively pointing out that since the measurements are made with infinitesimally small rigid rods and
clocks, there should be no indeterminacy in the metric as would presumably be the case with Weyl’s
gauge idea.
36[24, p. 71 and 100]. By analogy with Hegel’s stance who pretended to justify the number of planets,
thus incorporating even contingent features of the world in his overall rational scheme, Weyl’s theory
was, in Hilbert’s view, an instance of such theories aiming at deriving mathematically from general laws
the values of all significant quantities in nature, given fundamental equations and fully articulated initial
conditions.
37Hilbert to Weyl, April, 22, 1918, quoted in [33, p. 66].
38It should be noted that Eddington refers to the works of Mie (1912) and Hilbert (1915 and 1917)
in the bibliography at the end of [12, p. 264], as “most likely to be helpful on particular points, or as
of importance in the historic development”. His use of an action principle is thus to be assessed with
reference to these previous conceptions.
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the former is to be thought of as “the pure geometry applicable to a conceptual graphical
representation of all the quantities concerned in physics”39. While we are accustomed
to use graphs to represent geometrical or mechanical quantities, whether such graphs be
naturally suggested, as for measured distances, directions, areas and volumes, or require
convention, as for potentials, temperatures, forces, densities, etc., “we do not always
draw the graphs on a sheet of paper” and graphical representation may also occur “in a
conceptual mathematical space of any number of dimensions and possibly non-Euclidean
geometry”40 such as affine geometry, while remaining entirely free from assumptions
regarding the ultimate nature of things. But accordingly, unlike Hilbert, Eddington did
not seek to incorporate from the outset a theory of the structure of matter, such as Mie’s,
in his variational scheme, though as noted by [21, p. 46], his motivation for affine field
theory went beyond unification of gravitation and electromagnetism, and did not exclude
to shed light on the problem of the electron :
In passing beyond Euclidean geometry, gravitation makes its appearance; in
passing beyond Riemannian geometry, electromagnetic force appears; what remains
to be gained by further generalization? Clearly, the non-Maxwellian binding forces
which hold together an electron. But the problem of the electron must be diffi-
cult, and I cannot say whether the present generalization succeeds in providing the
material for its solution.41
While embracing for a couple of years Eddington’s affine field theory42, Einstein would
endeavour, though eventually in vain, to tackle the problems relating to the electron
within an affine framework, thus winding up with equations that Hilbert would later
consider a return to his own 1915 results, even if “on a colossal detour via Levi-Civita,
Weyl, Schouten, Eddington”43. However, in Eddington’s original view, the nature of the
electron seen as “a region of abnormal [viz. abnormally large] curvature”44 was thought
of as an open problem undetermined by the theory as it were. Whereas acknowledging
Eddington’s distinction between “world geometry” and “natural geometry”, Pauli for
instance, as recalled by [21], conceded the union of gravitational and electromagnetic
fields as only a phenomenological one, involving as such no recourse to the nature of the
charged elementary particles45.
Eddington’s case for variational derivatives hence originally appeared as an ingenious
way to keep mathematical theory in step with physical reality while refraining from
making any assumption on the nature of things. Supposing indeed atomicity to be
39[12, p. 198]
40[12, p. 196].
41[11, p. 104], quoted and commented in [21, p. 46].
42Einstein thus wrote to Bohr, on January, 11, 1923 : “I believe I have finally understood the connection
between electricity and gravitation. Eddington has come closer to the truth than Weyl”, as quoted and
commented in [21, p. 48].
43Cf. [27] for a comment on this quote from Hilbert’s 1923 Hamburg Lectures on the foundations of
physics.
44Cf. [21, p. 48].
45Cf. Pauli to Eddington, September, 20, 1923, [32, p. 115] : “I now do not at all believe that
the problem of elementary particles can be solved by any theory applying the concept of continuously
varying field strengths which satisfy certain differential equations to regions in the interior of elementary
particles.”
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a law inherent in nature, why should it be particularly concerned with matter, while
quantum theory would rather focus on action ? Inasmuch as action is deemed “the most
fundamental thing in the real world of physics, although the mind passes it because of
its lack of permanence”46, “Hamiltonian derivatives”, as Eddington conceived of them
at first, would thus ensure the mind’s collusion with nature by linking atomicity of
matter with atomicity of action. Whereas at a later stage, as affine field theory would
provide a framework for graphical representation, the whole machinery of “Hamiltonian
differentiation”, enlarged so as to accommodate gauge invariance, would no more keep the
mind in step with external reality and, by disregarding how mathematical theory might
precisely come into contact with actual world, would be turned into a mere heuristic
device for structural knowledge.
2. Bringing in patterns while striving for realism
Eddington conceived of physical reality as a “synthesis of appearances” integrating
into one single scheme as many aspects as possible of the world, inasmuch as the “rela-
tivistic outlook” aims at achieving the “point of view of no one in particular”47. This
process of gradual enrichment of the world image has been depicted by Eddington himself
as analogous to the sequence leading from monocular to binocular static vision, and then
to the enhanced view performed when different perspectives mesh48. As one may cur-
rently think of varying position, motion and magnitude-scale of the observer, more and
more comprehending geometric frameworks progressively emerge. Minkowski space-time
corresponds then to the world as “seen” by observers who may be granted all possible
uniform velocities, whereas owing to Riemannian geometry, Einstein’s general relativ-
ity encapsulates the whole range of observers’ viewpoints whatever be their velocities,
while, eventually, Weyl’s gauge principle would complete the whole relativity scheme by
allowing shrinking or expanding observers. Tensors were then meant to be the appro-
priate tool for achieving such a synthesis, since they provide, as [35, p. 190] elegantly
puts it, “a means of winnowing the wheat of ‘intrinsic information’ about the absolute
four-dimensional world from the extrinsic chaff of particular perspectives”. Since what
makes a tensor is nothing else but the lawlike way in which a set of quantities relative to
a given coordinate system transforms itself into another set of corresponding quantities,
when one shifts to a different coordinate system, tensor equations are invariant under
coordinate transformations. Though a tensor as such does not afford any measure of the
intrinsic properties of the physical world, except of course in the case of scalar tensors,
linear equations involving tensors do grasp these. Insistence on such an epistemic feature
of tensors conceived as giving access to the core of physical reality may have been actually
more or less entrenched in mathematical practice and thus rather current at the time49,
since recourse to tensors had been spurred precisely by the urge to decide how physical
statements may express a content which would be independent of any arbitrarily cho-
sen coordinate system. But the fact that this concern about physical reality eventually
resulted in giving structure priority over substance is certainly peculiar to Eddington’s
46[8, p. 200].
47[35, §7.3]
48Cf. [8, p. 182-183]
49Cf. in particular [45, §5].
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view in the early twenties. Relativity theory would indeed allegedly be held to require
a “higher order synthesis” yielding an ‘absolute’ world which, while “not [to be thought
of as] mind independent for it is composed of the ‘synthetic unity’ of all its relative
aspects”, would still be granted a form of unity presumably “not representable in space
and time, but only as a structure in a geometrical conceptual space”50.
2.1. Chasing the pucker
Inasmuch as he originally favoured a realist interpretation of the invariants of general
relativity theory by endowing them with an absolute significance, the main thrust of
Eddington’s argument consisted in denying any ultimate justification to the distinction
between allegedly ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ fields of force, thus looking for deeper reality as
embodied in structural space-time features fixed by differential equations. As Edding-
ton stressed in his lively exposition of relativity theory for the layman, it is for instance
customary to oppose gravitational and centrifugal forces by claiming that the first are
inescapable whereas the second presumably come from curvature of track. But since
the criterion allowing to deem artificial a certain field of force boils down to its possi-
ble annulling through choosing an appropriate observer, demarcating gravitation from
centrifugal force is in fact to be deprived of all grounds in Eddington’s view. It would
indeed be as much possible to remove gravitation - though piling it up somewhere else
- than centrifugal force, the only remaining difference being that the first is removable
only locally whereas the second can be removed everywhere. Since “gravitation is equally
unreal with centrifugal force”51, reality must then be sought at a deeper level. Not only
does Eddington underscore as “a remarkable fact that in a limited region, it is possible
to create an artificial field of force which imitates a natural gravitational force so ex-
actly that, so far as experiments have yet gone, no one can tell the difference”52, but he
also gives the “principle of equivalence” an unequivocal formulation by stating that “a
gravitational field of force is precisely equivalent to an artificial field of force, so that in
any small region it is impossible by any conceivable experiment to distinguish them”53.
Though likewise formulations have since been claimed unintelligible54 or even false since,
as shown by [29], gravitational field may arguably be detected through its tidal effects55,
Eddington seems to have endorsed them as a link in his reasoning. A gravitational field
50[35, p. 187].
51[8, p. 67], my emphasis.
52[8, p. 64].
53[8, p. 76].
54Cf. [40, p. IX] : “I have never been able to understand this Principle . . . Does it mean that the
effects of gravitational field are indistinguishable from the effects of an observer’s acceleration ? If so,
it is false. In Einstein’s theory, either there is a gravitational field or there is none, according as the
Riemann tensor does not or does vanish. This is an absolute property; it has nothing to do with any
observer’s world-line . . . The Principle of Equivalence performed the essential office of midwife at the
birth of general relativity, but, as Einstein remarked, the infant would never have gone beyond its long
clothes had it not been for Minkowski’s concept [of space-time geometry]. I suggest that the midwife be
now buried with appropriate honours and the facts of absolute space-time faced”.
55I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out to me the relevant paper by H. C. Ohanian,
[29, p. 903-904] : “it is generally believed that the effects of curvature will only manifest themselves in
regions of space-time of sufficiently large size. Our intuition suggests that as long as we explore only a
very small region, the curved space-time can be approximated with arbitrary precision by a flat space-
time. In Newtonian gravitation, this amounts to neglecting tidal effects. But in fact, our intuition lets
us down very badly. (. . . ) we will present several simple examples which show that in some systems
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being thus held practically indistinguishable from an artificial field of force in any suffi-
ciently small neighbourhood, the geometry of the four-dimensional world can equivalently
be explored either by practically tracing geodesics or by measuring space-time intervals
by means of unconstrained measuring appliances, viz. free-falling clocks and rods. There-
fore, since it can be flattened out by coordinate change, the gravitational field thought
of as the measured field has no absolute character whatsoever, but curvature does. The
ten potentials of the metric tensor ds2 = gµνdxµdxν do encapsulate the actual space-
time geometry in their own specific involved way which Eddington described vividly by
picturing the space-time in the gravitational field round matter as a pucker which can
be pressed out flat and shifted, but never suppressed since it always runs somewhere
else. “What determines the existence of the pucker is not the values of the g’s at any
point, or, what comes to the same thing, the field of force there. It is the way these
values link on to those at other points - the gradient of the g’s and more particularly the
gradient of the gradient”56. At this stage, curvature, action and matter form a network
of closely interrelated concepts, for not only “action is the curvature of the world” but
also “wherever there is matter there is action and therefore curvature”57, since curvature
can be represented by the Einstein tensor which in return is to be equated with matter.
2.2. Matter is provisional hodge-podge
As is well known, analogy with Poisson’s equation served as a guiding principle to
frame out the gravitational field equations. Einstein took it explicitly as a model of what
had to be done in relativity theory. Poisson’s equation ∇2φ = 4piGρ can be seen as
the Newtonian law of gravitation couched in terms of potential theory, and it expresses
the idea that the gravitational field arises from the density ρ of ponderable matter. But
then a new source term corresponding to stress-energy density, viz. the energy tensor
Tµν , has to be substituted in the right hand side of the equation for the scalar density of
matter ρ, whereas the left hand side tensor which is to be built out of the gµν must be
constrained by three conditions stemming from the analogy with Poisson’s equation58,
namely that 1. it is not allowed to contain differential coefficients of the gµν higher than
the second, 2. it has to be linear in them, and 3. its divergence must vanish identically.
Tensors satisfying the first two conditions are proved to conform to one single pattern
Rµν − a.gµνR, where Rµν denotes the Ricci curvature tensor obtained by contraction
from the Riemann tensor and R is the scalar curvature R = gµνRµν , whereas the third
condition imposes the parameter’s value − 12 . The whole deductive process thus ends up
with Einstein’s field equations
Rµν − 12gµνR = −κTµν (6)
which in return admit of two different interpretations, depending on whether one reads
them from right to left or from left to right. The first way suggests that energy determines
the effects of curvature never do disappear, not even in the limiting cases of systems of infinitesimal
size. All these examples involve very well-known physical effects which can be discussed entirely in the
framework of Newtonian gravitational theory, however the relevance of these effects to the question of
equivalence of inertia and gravitation has not been sufficiently appreciated.”
56[8, p. 85].
57[8, p. 148].
58Cf. [17, p. 48]
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or shapes geometry, while the second embodies the reverse view according to which the
fixing of the gµν defines eo ipso the energy content of the world. Comparing his own
equations to “a building one wing of which is made of fine marble (left hand part of
the equation), but the other wing of which is built of low grade wood (right hand side
of the equation)”59, Einstein himself thought of the phenomenological representation of
matter, viz. Tµν , as a pis aller, since it was “only a crude substitute for a representation
which would correspond to all known properties of matter”60. He thus emphasized that
the right-hand side of the field equations was nothing but an unsatisfactory aggregate
intending to cement different things whose ultimate nature was still unknown.
We have seen, indeed, that in a more complete analysis the energy tensor can
be regarded only as a provisional means of representing matter. In reality, matter
consists of electrically charged particles (...) It is only the circumstance that we
have no sufficient knowledge of the electromagnetic field of concentrated charges
that compels us, provisionally, to leave undetermined, in presenting the theory, the
true form of this tensor. From this point of view our problem now is to introduce a
tensor, Tµν , of the second rank, whose structure we do not know but provisionally,
and which includes in itself the energy density of the electromagnetic field and of
ponderable matter.61
Einstein would later be even more explicit in his Autobiographical Notes, when he
insists that the right hand side of the field equation was “a formal condensation of
all things whose comprehension in the sense of a field theory is still problematic”, the
whole formulation being “a makeshift in order to give the general principle of relativity a
preliminary closed-form expression”, for it was essentially no more than “a theory of the
gravitational field, which was isolated somewhat artificially from a total field of as yet
unknown structure”62. These cautious remarks by Einstein suggest in particular that a
more fine-grained analysis of the true form of this tensor would allegedly require a better
understanding of how general relativity and quantum mechanics might mesh.
2.3. Analogizing permanence
However, Eddington seems to have deliberately overlooked such intricacies, at least
at a first stage in the early twenties, since he squarely interpreted field equations as
providing a definition of matter while justifying his use of such a principle of identification
by bringing to the fore the process of analogizing permanence. He thus deemed the
vanishing of the divergence of the Einstein tensor63, better known to physicists as the
contracted Bianchi identities, the “fundamental theorem of mechanics” inasmuch as it
allowed such an identification step.
The divergence of Gνµ− 12gνµG is identically zero. In three dimensions the vanish-
ing of the divergence is the condition of continuity of flux, e. g. in hydrodynamics
59[16, p. 370].
60Ibid.
61[17, p. 48].
62[38, p. 75].
63Eddington uses G’s instead of R’s to denote the Ricci tensor and the scalar curvature, and, in the
passage quoted above, he applies the rule for raising indices, viz. Aµλ =
P
ν g
µνAλν , to the Einstein
tensor Rµν − 12gµνR.
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∂u/∂x + ∂v/∂y + ∂w/∂z = 0. Adding a time-coordinate, this becomes the con-
dition of conservation or permanence ... It will be realised how important for a
theory of the material world is the discovery of a world-tensor which is inherently
permanent.64
Mathematics thus provides a well-behaved tensor that summarizes the common prop-
erties of matter pertaining to mass, momentum and stress, and it is indeed all that is
needed for Eddington’s world-building purposes. While discarding matter as an inde-
pendent substance, Eddington thence claims that ci-devant phenomenological matter is
to be taken in charge by would-be substantial tensors.
Moreover it is not an accident that it should be this particular tensor [i.e.
Gνµ − 12gνµG ] which is capable of being recognised by us. It is because its di-
vergence vanishes - because it satisfies the law of conservation - that it fulfils the
primary condition for being recognised as substantial. If we are to surround our-
selves with a perceptual world at all, we must recognise as substance that which
has some element of permanence. We may not be able to explain how the mind
recognises as substantial the world-tensor Gνµ − 12gνµG, but we can see that it could
not well recognise anything simpler. There are no doubt minds which have not this
predisposition to regard as substantial the things which are permanent; but we shut
them up in lunatic asylums.65
Pattern recognition is thus the mind’s own contribution though a “real objective sub-
stratum” is given, as the eye only picks but a few selected patterns out of the unbounded
variety of those which could be traced in the starry heavens and in a certain way are
there independently of our grasping them. Gνµ− 12gνµG is one of these and, as Eddington
lively puts it, “where it can trace it, the mind says : ‘Here is substance’; where it cannot,
it says ‘How uninteresting ! There is nothing in my line here’.”66 The seed of selective
subjectivism thus seems to have been already sown at this stage in the soil of Eddington’s
rooted realism. Later on, in the thirties, Eddington would develop such a view as an
independent full-fledged doctrine by gradually emancipating it from these early twenties
bonds of faithfulness to original concerns for physical reality. Among many others, a
striking illustration of this mature stance was given in the form of a parable in which
Eddington imagines an ichthyologist who would explore the depths of the ocean and, by
inspection of what would come up in his fish nets, would formulate two general laws out
of his catch : 1. “no-creature is less than two inches long”; and 2. “all sea-creatures have
gills”. To whom may contest the first claim, the ichthyologist would answer : “what can’t
be caught in my nets is beyond ichthyological knowledge”, and so does Eddington aver
analogously that “generalisations that can be reached epistemologically have a security
which is denied to those that can only be reached empirically”67. Inasmuch as he even-
tually embraced this view of the mind selecting a priori patterns as objective features
amidst empirical reality, Eddington verged to sidestep how mathematical theory comes
into contact with the actual world, though he originally addressed this issue by the early
twenties in his case for “Hamiltonian derivatives”.
64[12, §52, p. 115], the emphasis is Eddington’s.
65[12, §54, p. 120], my emphasis.
66[10, p. 420]
67[14, p. 19]
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3. “Hamiltonian derivatives” and their dual role
3.1. Making the mind collude with nature
According to Eddington’s view, as recapitulated at a first stage in [12, § 64], math-
ematical theory can be tied up with the physical world either (1) by identifying the
mathematical interval with a quantity which is the result of practical measurement with
scales and clocks, or (2) by identifying the tensor Gνµ − 12gνµG with phenomenological
matter, namely “with the mechanical abstraction of matter which comprises the mea-
surable properties of mass, momentum and stress”68. These two points of contact then
make it possible to build a “complete cycle of reasoning”69 by pasting together two dif-
ferent trains of thought : a purely deductive chain which consists in deriving the energy
tensor from the space-time interval and a reverse chain passing from matter as defined by
the energy tensor to the interval thought of as resulting from measurements made with
appliances built out of matter thus conceived. The full completion of this second chain
would then bring about something more than what is encapsulated in the energy tensor,
since measurement requires the existence of discrete particles70. However atomicity of
matter comes into the picture as crucially connected with the issue of realism. Reading
the field equations from left to right and hence identifying matter with the energy tensor
would have two main consequences, as claimed by [20, p. 230], namely (1) eliminating
substance from our ontology in favour of relational structures, and (2) emphasizing the
dependence on the mind, of matter as identified with the energy tensor. But assuming
that pattern recognition is really contributed by the mind, why should mathematical
identities constrain the external world whatsoever ? Granting atomicity would indeed
entail acknowledging the fact that there are laws in the external world, since “we have
not learnt why the quality called matter exists only in certain lumps, called atoms or
electrons”71. Hence, if mind cannot account for atomicity, what could account for it ?
A more likely suggestion is that our analysis into point events is not final; and
if we would carry the analysis beyond the point event to something still more fun-
damental, then atomicity and the remaining laws of physics would become obvious
identities. This may well be the case. ... But if we attempt to push the analysis
behind the point events, we are, I think, bound to particularize the structure.72
Along these lines, [20] claims that, though atomicity seems to reflect non structural
substance, “the structural account of atomicity [would ] remove even this substantial
element”73, resulting later in Eddington’s mature structuralism owing to a better un-
derstanding of how general relativity and quantum theory engage with one another.
Whereas obviously hinting at such a structuralist account of atomicity, Eddington nev-
ertheless suggests following a different track in the early twenties.
Matter is a property of the world to which the human mind attributes an exag-
gerated importance for reasons which Nature would regard irrelevant; yet she seems
68[12, § 64, p. 146].
69[12, p. 146]
70Cf. [35, p. 208] for details.
71[9, p. 156]
72[9, p. 157].
73[20, p. 232]
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to be in collusion with mind in singling out this property for atomicity. I can only
suggest that the difficulty might disappear if we understood better the true relation
between atomicity of matter and the more general atomicity which underlies all
quantum phenomena. As far as we can understand it at present, there is some kind
of atomicity of the quantity known in mechanics as Action, and this seems to be
the fundamental origin of all atomic phenomena. If so, that must be Nature’s own
idea, for which she is in no way indebted to us. (. . . ) If then we can account for the
apparent atomicity of matter as resulting from the quanta of Action, the difficulty
alluded to will disappear; but this is at present a speculation.74
[12, §60] made this speculation more precise owing to what Eddington coined “Hamil-
tonian derivatives” which were intended to embody the mind’s collusion with nature by
linking matter with action. Such variational derivatives are thus not to be thought of
solely as “expressing Mind’s regard for permanence”75 or as providing the means to make
the theoretical and the mental world-building converge76, but also as tuning up mind’s
privileged pattern to “Nature’s own idea”, as far as Eddington meant the role ascribed
to “Hamiltonian differentiation” to be dual.
3.2. The noble art of “Hamiltonian differentiation”
Action is usually defined in mechanics as energy multiplied by time. But from a
broader point of view, as Eddington laid much stress on in [12, §60, p. 138], action
can be envisaged under two different aspects, namely (1) as a physical quantity which
has a definite numerical value and is of special significance since it is invariant, or (2)
as a mathematical function of some variables, whose functional form depends on the
variables in terms of which the action is to be expressed. Starting with the invariant
integral representing gravitational action in a four-dimensional space-time region
A =
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
G
√−gdτ, (7)
where g = det gµν , and G = gµνGµν , described as the “Gaussian curvature”77, is the
Ricci scalar, Eddington considers the variation of the integral, δA, for arbitrary small
variations of the variables, δgµν , which vanish at and near the boundary of the given
region and thus obtains the following relation :
δ
∫
G
√−gdτ = −
∫ (
Gµν − 1
2
gµνG
)
δgµν
√−gdτ. (8)
The coefficient − (Gµν − 12gµνG), now known as the variational derivative, is what Ed-
dington calls the “Hamiltonian derivative” of G with respect to gµν , which he denotes
as follows
hG
hgµν
= −
(
Gµν − 1
2
gµνG
)
= 8piTµν . (9)
74[9, p. 158], my emphasis.
75[35, §7.5.2]
76[20, p. 234]
77Recall that Eddington denotes the Ricci tensor and the scalar curvature tensor with G’s instead of
R’s as is usual nowadays.
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Though relying on ideas which, as seen above, can be traced back to Hilbert who first
used variational methods to derive gravitational field equations, Eddington nevertheless
moulded his own interpretation of Hamilton’s variational principle by bringing to the fore
a key property of variational derivatives. One can indeed apply just the same method to
any invariant K and yield a variational derivative of K with respect to gµν , namely
hK
hgµν
= Pµν . (10)
Eddington then proves that the variational derivative of any fundamental invariant is a
tensor whose divergence vanishes78, which thus makes variational derivatives in general
the appropriate means for conveying permanence and embodying the mind’s privileged
pattern. But at the same time, this essential property opens the way to alternative
energy tensors, since one could have started equivalently with these three fundamental
invariants79 :
K = G, K ′ = GµνGµν , K ′′ = BρµνσB
µνσ
ρ , (11)
thus giving rise to “three alternative material worlds”80 between which it is impossible
to decide on observational grounds, since observation boils down to schedules of pointer-
readings and “after all it is the relation which is the reality”81. As far as systems of
coincidences are the only available evidence, all these alternative tensors allegedly do the
same thing and are indeed equivalent, so that the criterion of simplicity seems to be the
only guiding principle left to make a choice and pick out the Ricci scalar.
Since the early twenties, modifications of Einstein’s theory of gravity induced by
such alternative Lagrangians leading to higher-order field equations have received much
attention over years, though with alternating high and low tides depending on the way
the pros and cons of the corresponding prospects were assessed. With hindsight, four
different steps may advantageously be distinguished insofar as subsequent developments
presumably unfold some of the implicit grounds supporting Eddington’s claim that such
possibly alternative theories of gravity cannot be observationally demarcated.
(1) Shortly after the advent of general relativity, while opening the way to the explo-
ration of such alternative general relativistic theories of gravitation, Weyl ([44], [43, sec.
35 & 36]) underscored the general significance of quadratic Lagrangians for a possible ex-
tension of relativity theory and, in so doing, not only suggested the two invariants which
Eddington takes into account in addition to the Ricci scalar, namely in current notation
L2 = RµνRµν and L3 = RµνρσRµνρσ, but also the one obtained directly from the Ricci
scalar, viz. L1 = R2. Bach ([1]) then focussed on such invariants and their combinations
and showed how they can be reduced to a small number of them. Anyway Weyl would
later prove that all such alternative Lagrangians give rise to fourth order vacuum field
equations by contrast with the standard Einstein second order ones based on the Ricci
scalar82, which was presumably part of the rationale for choosing the Ricci scalar as the
base invariant K in the action principle (cf. equ. (7)). Still, other choices for K would
78Cf. [12, §61, p. 140]
79As will be seen below, Eddington denotes the Riemann-Christoffel tensor by Bρµνσ .
80[12, § 62, p. 141].
81[12, p. 144].
82Cf. [43, Appendix II].
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also imply “admissible laws of gravitation”83 since these alternative Lagrangians would
accordingly lead to contracted Bianchi identities and would thus satisfy the fundamental
theorem of mechanics. How then would it be possible to discriminate between such al-
ternative laws if “any field of gravitation agreeing with Einstein’s law would also satisfy
the alternative law proposed, [though] not usually vice versa”84? Eddington thus estab-
lished for instance that the Schwartzschild’s solution is also a solution of the alternative
equations
hL2
hgµν
= 0,
hL3
hgµν
= 0, (12)
and later Buchdahl ([4, p. 90]) would also prove the same for
hL1
hgµν
= 0. (13)
(2) More generally, Pauli ([30]) had already shown that every vacuum solution, in-
cluding the Schwarzschild one, of Einstein’s field equations is also a solution of
hL1
hgµν
= 0,
hL2
hgµν
= 0, (14)
Since, as noted by [22, p. 634], the Schwarzschild solution of Einstein’s equations is
the basis of the classical tests of general relativity ([31]), Pauli could argue that the
equations lead to no observational disagreement with Einstein’s theory regarding the
shift of Mercury’s perihelion and the light deviation in the solar gravitational field85.
Presumably, this is the basis of Eddington’s claim that the alternative theories cannot
be distinguished by any “schedules of pointer-readings”.
(3) Still, only later results would shed some light on the hidden rationale behind
Eddington’s insight :
When we ask which of the three [admissible laws of gravitation] is the law of the
actual world, I am not sure that the question has any meaning ... One cannot but
suspect that there is some identical relation between the Hamiltonian derivatives of
the three fundamental invariants. If this relation were discovered it would perhaps
clear up a rather mysterious subject.86
From the thirties on, Lanczos advocated quadratic Lagrangians as a basis for unified
field theory inasmuch as “field equations of nature” would presumably be deducible
from a scale invariant action principle ([26]) and, in support of his view, he had indeed
proved already in the late thirties ([25]), that the general possibilities for such alternative
Lagrangians reduce to the two only effective invariants L1 = R2 and L2 = RµνRµν and
combinations thereof, since all the others (in particular L3 = RµνρσRµνρσ) prove inactive
in the formation of field equations. More precisely, when studying the action principle
δ
∫
Idτ = 0 which controls the field equations, Lanczos assumes that the fundamental
83[12, p. 143].
84[12, p. 143].
85Cf. [41, p. 105-106].
86[12, p. 144].
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invariant I is to be a merely algebraic function of the components of the Riemann-
Christoffel tensor Rµνρσ and, owing to combinatorial considerations, proves first that
there are five apparently independent invariants suitable for action principle, namely the
usual L1, L2, L3 plus two additional ones K1 and K2. He then shows that “this surplus
of invariants is only apparent” inasmuch as “the invariants K1 and K2 do not contribute
any terms to the field equations since their variation reduces to a mere boundary term”87
and thus obtains in particular the following linear relation between the invariants L1,
L2, L3 and K2 :
K2 = L3 − 4L2 + L1 (15)
Since the field equations deduced from K2 by action principle vanish identically, the field
equations implied by the variation of the action integral
∫
L3dτ are identical with those
derived from the action integral
∫
(4L2 − L1)dτ . As the true source from which stem
the identities alluded to, the linear relation between the fundamental types of alternative
invariants (equ.(15)) then encapsulates the reason why the fourth-order equations based
on L1, L2, L3 contain the solutions of Einstein’s second-order equations and thus, as
noted by [22, p. 634], justifies “Eddington’s mathematical hunch”.
(4) However, the viability of such alternative gravitational theories came to be even-
tually disclaimed with respect to their weak-field behaviour in the sixties and the seven-
ties. Buchdahl ([5]) grounded his rebuttal of gravitational theories derived from a pure R2
quadratic Lagrangian on the fact that the corresponding field equations cannot represent
space asymptotically flat at infinity. Though, as explained above, the Schwarzschild’s
solution allowed one, in the case of vacuum field equations, to argue in the sense of
observational equivalence of alternative gravitational theories inasmuch as providing a
common base for experimental tests, Bicknell ([2]) showed that, when one brings in a
stress-energy tensor, predictions differ markedly from observations, not only for theories
based on pure quadratic Lagrangians R2, but also for those derived from the most gen-
eral Lagrangian, viz. RijRij − νR2 (owing to Lanczos result above), since weak-field
approximation makes it clear that in such Lagrangians the R2 term dominates. From
a different viewpoint, Havas ([22]) established that in the presence of extended sources,
higher-order alternative theories contradict Newton’s law of gravitation in the non rel-
ativistic limit, unless one allows for asymptotical agreement with additional terms, and
even in this case, such generalizations of Einstein’s law would not yield static spherically
symmetric solutions of Schwarzschild’s form thus failing to comply with Birkhoff’s theo-
rem88. Since the main problem concerns extended mass distribution, Havas significantly
comments on Eddington’s acknowledging the fact that fourth-order vacuum equations
admit more than one type of spherically symmetric solutions, though failing to recognize
that only one of these is the limit of the solution for an extended source. After having
put forward the Schwarzschild’s solution, Eddington remarked that “there are doubtless
other symmetrical solutions for the alternative laws of gravitation which are not permit-
ted by Einstein’s law, since the differential equations are now of the fourth order and
87[25, p. 845].
88I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this point and for mentioning the relevant
paper by Havas. In this connection, one may recall, as explained in [22, p. 640], that, for instance in
the case of a single spherically symmetric body in Einstein’s theory, Birkhoff’s theorem states that “the
field exterior to the body is independent of its size and internal stresses and is identical to the static
spherically vacuum solution”.
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involve two extra boundary conditions either at the particle or at infinity”89, without
noticing though that such other symmetrical solutions should be related to the solutions
with extended sources90. On the base of such results, one might thus be inclined to take
Eddington’s claim of the observational indistinguishability of alternative gravitational
theories cum grano salis91.
3.3. How “Hamiltonian derivatives” do work out what they are meant for
Whatever be the case, there is nevertheless another feature of variational derivatives
which should be neither downplayed nor misinterpreted, for it plays the essential role
in allowing the mind’s collusion with nature. Integrals for which variational derivatives
vanish have a constant value. Therefore, in the remarkable case of action, one might be
tempted to acknowledge this fact as a stronghold in favour of the principle of stationary
action, but one would then simply miss the point, since, in Eddington’s view, “just as in
the ordinary differential calculus, we are not solely concerned with problems of maxima
and minima, and we take some interest in differential coefficients which do not vanish;
so Hamiltonian derivatives may be worthy of attention even when they disappoint us by
failing to vanish”92. But what happens when variational derivatives do not vanish ? And
how their virtual non-vanishing may help linking atomicity of matter with atomicity of
action ? At first sight, the principle of stationary action seems to be at odds with the
derivation of Einstein’s field equations through variational differentiation, since action
cannot be stationary but in empty space, namely when Tµν vanishes.
It would thus appear that the Principle of Stationary Action is in general untrue.
Nevertheless some modified statement of the principle appears to have considerable
significance. In the actual world the space occupied by matter (electrons) is ex-
tremely small compared with the empty regions. Thus the Principle of Stationary
Action, although not universally true, expresses a very general tendency - a ten-
dency with exceptions. Our theory does not account for this atomicity of matter;
89[12, p. 143].
90Havas luminously points out that this problem is “closely related to the one which caused Newton
to delay publication of the Principia for two decades”([22, p. 639]), namely the issue concerning the
relation between a postulated force law between two mass points and the corresponding force law between
two homogeneous spheres. “This problem is independent of any field equations satisfied by the force or
the corresponding potential; however, if such equations, rather than elementary force laws, are taken as
basic, a new question arises, namely, whether these equations admit more than one type of spherically
symmetric solutions. In the case of the Laplace’s equation only one such type of solution exists, and
the resultant 1/r potential between two point masses M1 and M2 is identical to the potential between
two homogeneous spheres with centers at a distance r apart and of masses M1 and M2 and radii R1
and R2 respectively. While this Newtonian result appears trivial even from the vantage point of 19th
century mathematics, it was noted only recently that there is no other potential with these properties.
No potential between point particles other than one proportional to e−λr/r yields a potential between
spheres that has the same dependence on r, and only if λ vanishes (the Newtonian case) is the coefficient
of the resultant potential independent of the radii”([22, p. 640]). The thrust of the argument is then to
argue that there is no such theorem in the case of higher-order field equations arising from alternative
Lagrangians.
91Nevertheless, to conclude this point with a cautious remark, this verdict of non-viability may perhaps
not be ultimate inasmuch as challenged to a certain extent by recent developments ([6]) which revive
interest in such gravity theories with quadratic Lagrangians by working out the Newtonian limit of
fourth-order gravity along a metric approach requiring a different framework.
92[12, p. 138].
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and in the stationary variation of action, we seem to have an indication of the way
of approaching this difficult problem, although the precise formulation of the law of
atomicity is not yet achieved. It is suspected that it may involve an “action” which
is capable only of discontinuous variation.93
The non-vanishing of the variational derivatives thus pinpoints the possible juncture
of general relativity and quantum theory. Variational derivatives do indeed vanish on
the average though they may fail to vanish at some definite spots, thus making atomicity
of matter compatible with stationary action by granting that both properties do not
conflict since they stand at two different levels. The scheme of things thus provided is to
be thought of as a provisional overall framework which does not preclude nor anticipate
further refinements, since, as Eddington warns, “the possibility of the existence of an
electron in space is a remarkable phenomenon which we do not yet understand”, and
“the details of [whose] structure must be determined by unknown equations”94.
Technically, variational derivatives combine two different kinds of features, namely (1)
they may not vanish at the fine-grained level while vanishing on the average, and at the
same time (2) their divergence always vanish. This peculiar conjunction of properties is
precisely what suit them for the dual role of making mind collude with Nature, since the
hunger for permanence which characterizes the mind can then be hooked to the “creative
aspect” of these “Hamiltonian derivatives” which reveals nature’s contribution. Though
the law of conservation results from the mind’s demand, Eddington stresses the fact that
“we [not only ] might have built things which do not satisfy this law” but “in fact we do
build one very important thing, ‘action’, which is not permanent”, so that “in respect
to “action”, physics has taken the bit in her teeth, and has insisted on recognising this
as the most fundamental thing at all, although the mind has not thought it worthy of a
place in the familiar world and has not vivified it by any mental image or conception”95.
But since the non-vanishing of the infinitesimal variation of gravitational action δA
(cf. equ. (7)) entails the non-vanishing of the variational derivative and hence of the
energy tensor Tµν (cf. equ. (8)), variational derivatives do link atomicity of action with
atomicity of matter. Besides, δA being the variation of the action integral over a four di-
mensional space-time region, its non vanishing can be seen as a sparking event within the
boundaries of this region, which grounds Eddington’s claim that “Hamiltonian deriva-
tives” are to be endowed with a “creative character”.
It is a feature of our attitude towards nature that we pay great regard to that
which is permanent; and for the same reason the creation of anything in the midst
of a region is signalised by us as more worthy of remark than its entry in the or-
thodox manner through the boundary. Thus when we consider how an invariant
depends on the variables used to describe the world, we attach more importance to
changes which result in creation than to changes which merely involve transfer from
elsewhere. It is perhaps for this reason that the Hamiltonian derivative of an invari-
ant gives a quantity of greater significance for us than, for example, the ordinary
derivative. The Hamiltonian derivative has a creative quality, and thus stands out
in our minds as an active agent working in the passive field of space-time. Unless
this idiosyncrasy of our practical outlook is understood, the Hamiltonian method
93[12, p. 139].
94[12, p. 153]
95[13, p. 241].
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with its casting away of boundary integrals appears somewhat artificial; but it is
actually the natural method of deriving physical quantities prominent in our survey
of the world, because it is guided by those principles which have determined their
prominence.96
Up to this stage, variational derivatives were meant to implement a speculative unifi-
catory scheme by homogenizing sparkles of discontinuous action into uniform field equa-
tions, owing to inherent mathematical features that happen to be adequate for this pur-
pose, and by the same token, they were supposed to grant mind’s adherence to external
reality.
As he tried to accommodate his view to Weyl’s ideas regarding pure infinitesimal
geometry and gauge invariance, Eddington however shifted, at a further stage of his
developing relativity theory, from a world-building which would proceed along Einstein’s
lines from the fundamental metric tensor gµν , to an allegedly non metrical world geometry
which would be entirely derived from the mere assumption of a metric independent
affine connection. Within this new framework, the method of identification would deal
with gauge invariant tensors and customary action would be discarded as an invariant,
therefore variational derivatives would go out of tune and fit no more mind’s pattern to
nature’s proper initiatives.
4. Going out of tune through gauge invariance
Though he credited Weyl for having contributed to complete the relativistic out-
look by removing the last remnant of Euclidean “distant geometry” that still prevented
Riemannian geometry from being a pure infinitesimal geometry, Eddington adopted an
original view which “entirely alters the status of Weyl’s theory”, since it presents it as
“no longer a hypothesis, but a [mere] graphical representation of the facts”97 whose value
lies in the insight it suggests.
4.1. Gauge transformations
While denying the tacitly assumed comparability of lengths at different points, Weyl
brought in the gauge concept in order to account for non-integrability of length by gen-
eralizing Riemannian metric. Since the length of a vector may change depending on the
path which is followed when it is transferred from a point P to a nearby point P ′, Weyl’s
method consists in fixing a unit of length, viz. a “gauge”, at each point of the space-time
manifold, so that the variation of length may be measured by comparing the length with
the gauges attached to the successive points at which the vector is to be located along its
path. Since gauge systems may be arbitrarily chosen just like coordinate systems, gauge
change means multiplying lengths by a scale coefficient, λ(x), which is a strictly positive
real valued function ranging over space-time manifold points, viz.
l = λ(x).l and gµν = λ(x)
2gµν (16)
By analogy with the affine connection which fixes the meaning of Levi-Civita parallel
displacement owing to the vanishing of the covariant derivative, Weyl then defines the
96[12, p. 147], my emphasis.
97[12, p. 208]
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length connection as allowing congruent displacement98. Assuming that a vector Aµ is
transferred from a point P to a nearby point P ′, and comparing its original length l
measured by the gauge at P with its ultimate length l + δl measured by the gauge at
P ′, the change of length, δl, can be partly ascribed to the shifting of position on the one
hand and to the recalibrating of the unit length imposed by the gauge system on the
other hand, which, as [35, p. 152] explains, corresponds to the following stipulation
δl :=
∂l
∂xµ
.dxµ + l.dφ (17)
Congruent displacement then suggests the vanishing of the δl variation, so that dl =
−ldφ holds, provided that the two parts, namely the shifting of the position and the
recalibrating of the unit of length, may be supposed independent, and that the first
part ∂l∂xµ .dx
µ may be replaced by the complete differential dl. The same relation holds,
when the length is recalibrated by choosing an alternative gauge system, l = λ.l, since
dl¯ = −l¯.dφ¯ stems obviously from the Leibniz rule dl¯ = dλ.l+λ.dl, so that the multiplying
factor depending on the new gauge system is such that dφ¯ = dφ− dλλ .
But defining the length connection requires the further condition that the congruent
displacement of a vector does not alter its length. In spite of its apparently tautological
flavour, this clause avers that a gauge-system may be found for which δλ = 0 when there
is congruent displacement. Weyl then infers that the multiplying factor dφ being a linear
differential form
dφ =
∑
i
φidxi (18)
is a necessary and sufficient condition for making dφ, and hence dl, vanish. Assuming
that the φi in dφ = φidxi are given numbers at P , since dφ¯ = dφ− dλλ , it suffices to choose
the gauge system λ for which dφ = dλλ , and therefore
∑
i φidxi = d(log λ), holds. The
linear differential form then expresses the property that the factor of proportionality dφ
does depend neither on the length l nor on the direction of the displaced vector, but only
on the infinitesimal displacements dxi, since four coefficients φi are attached to every
point of the space-time manifold and may vary from one point to another.
The metrical structure of the space-time manifold may then be characterized, accord-
ing to Weyl, by two fundamental differential forms, namely one quadratic form gijdxidxj
and one linear form φidxi, so that the ten potentials gij and the four coefficients φi are
not only invariant under coordinate transformations but also transform according to the
following gauge transformation rule for the length connection
g¯ij = λ2gij , φ¯i = φi − 1
λ
∂λ
∂xi
. (19)
Weyl then envisages a conformal structure for which the ratio of the lengths of any
two vectors at the same point and the angle between them are determined, but not the
length of the vectors themselves, so that the gauge can be chosen arbitrarily at each point
provided it is smooth. Since it is to be considered up to conformal equivalence, the metric
no longer determines a single affine connection but a whole equivalence class thereof99.
98Cf. [45, § 16]
99[39, p. 209] for the details.
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Therefore, as stressed in [35, p. 153], such a weakening of the metrical structure requires
a further property - the “fundamental theorem of infinitesimal geometry”, as Weyl calls
it - which states that the affine connection can be defined in one and only one way so
that parallel displacement does not alter the length of the displaced vector, and then can
be made univocally compatible with the length connection.
As is well known, Weyl’s main step consisted in identifying the φi coefficients of the
linear form associated with the metric through the concept of gauging with the electro-
magnetic potentials100, thus aiming at unifying the laws of gravitation and the laws of
electromagnetism within a common geometrical framework. Since transporting a vector
from a point P of the space-time manifold along a closed path generally modifies both
direction and length, Weyl’s geometrical programme roughly boils down to jointly ascrib-
ing the non-integrability of direction to the gravitational field and the non-integrability
of length to the electromagnetic field, assuming that objective features of the world can
thus be expressed by measurements owing to the continuous variation which affects a
vector when transferred along a closed path.
4.2. Shifting to the affine field
Eddington’s criticism of Weyl’s theory mainly focused on the hybrid character that
the notion of a gauge-system would inevitably be endowed with, being supposedly partly
conventional and partly physical. Though, as explained in [35, p. 224], Weyl claimed
that the comparison of the lengths of point-bound vectors pointing in different directions
be immediately given by an eidetic intuition through the imaginative rotation of the first
vector about its location point, in an allegedly homogeneous space, until it coincides with
the second vector, Eddington could not make sense of Weyl’s phenomenological account
unless as relying implicitly on optical appliances. Therefore, according to Eddington’s
reading of Weyl’s theory, whereas one can compare lengths in different directions but at
the same point by experimental methods, lengths at different points cannot be compared
by physical transfer of clocks and rods and require gauge conventions. More generally
Eddington incriminated Weyl’s original presentation of his theory as involving some sort
of “essential tension between an a priori epistemological principle of relativity of magni-
tude and the existence of a natural gauge of the world testified in actual measurements
with rods and clocks”101. Eddington’s way out then consisted in demarcating the “world
geometry”, which he conceived only as a “graphical representation” of the physical world,
namely as a mere conventional, though as adequate as possible, geometrizing which as
such is to be thought of as devoid of any assumption regarding the ultimate nature of
things, on the one hand, from the “natural geometry” built out of actual measurements
on the other hand, which he discarded at the outset as hybrid and would only reconstruct
at a later stage owing to identifications. Representing physical quantities in a graphical
way by geometrical magnitudes not only affords perspicuity by allowing to “set before
ourselves a mass of information in such a way that the eye can take it in at a glance”102,
but also explanatory power by making the whole range of geometrical notions available
for extensive search and unpacking of the informative content thus encapsulated.
100Cf. [35, p. 158] for the details
101[35, p. 225].
102[12, p. 196].
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It is therefore reasonable to seek enlightenment by giving a graphical repre-
sentation to all the physical quantities with which we have to deal. In this way
physics becomes geometrized. But graphical representation does not assume any
hypothesis as to the ultimate nature of the quantities represented. The possibility
of representing the whole world of physics in a unified geometrical representation is
a test not of the nature of the world but of the ingenuity of the mathematician.103
However, enhanced insight should not overshadow the fact that the geometrical space
in which all relevant physical quantities are represented is to be thought of as “some new
conceptual space - not actual space”104. Though it would later happen to spur Einstein’s
quest for a geometrical unified field theory105, Eddington’s highly original reconstruction
of physics from the postulation of a metric independent affine connection was thus meant
at the outset to instantiate a notion of ‘geometrization’ which would neither remove, nor
add, anything from, or to, Einstein’s theory, but aimed at a better understanding of
the known laws of physics. Technically, Eddington disentangles the affine connection Γkij
from the underlying metric tensor gµν , posits it as a starting point, and then proceeds
to develop the whole scheme of relativity theory out of the single notion of infinitesimal
parallel displacement in addition to the assumption of an appropriate topology for the
four-dimensional manifold. Accordingly a displacement which is to be conceived as a
certain relation of extension between two nearby points is not to be thought of as a vector
since, strictly speaking, it ought to be endowed with no length at all, inasmuch as no such
thing as a metric is defined yet. Supposing then an infinitesimal displacement Aµ at the
point P of coordinates xµ, one would wish to select the one displacement Aµ+dAµ which
has “some kind of equivalence”106 to the displacement Aµ out of the whole collection of
displacements bound to a nearby point P ′ of coordinates xµ + dxµ. Though the nature
of this equivalence is left undefined and “need(s) not be determinate observationally”,
Eddington assumes its having “some significance in regard to the ultimate structure of
world”107. Since the most general expression for the continuous change of Aµ in the
parallel transference from P to P ′ is of the form
dAµ = −ΓµναAαdxν , (20)
Eddington reversely postulates the Γµνα as mere arbitrary coefficients and assigns them
the task to settle the equivalence between nearby parallel displacements, while requiring
that they fulfil one fundamental symmetry condition
Γµνα = Γ
µ
αν (21)
resulting from the axiomatically posited parallelogram law which states that if a dis-
placement AB is equivalent to CD, then AC is equivalent to BD. Therefore are these
Γµνα coefficients fitted to provide the building blocks out of which physics is to be recon-
structed.
103[12, p. 196].
104[12, p. 197]
105Cf. [35, ch. 8] and [21, §4.3.2] for a precise account of the interplay between Eddington and Einstein
and their divergence about the meaning of affine connections and geometrization.
106[12, p. 213].
107[12, p. 213].
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World-building then parallels the traditional derivation of the main tensors of Rie-
mannian geometry by replacing them with constructs - named “in-tensors” in Edding-
tonian parlance, though now better identified as scale covariant tensors, and marked by
a prefixed asterisk - which not only possess the same properties than their Riemannian
counterparts with regard to transformations of coordinates but are also unaffected by
gauge transformations, which Eddington formulates as follows by giving them a slight
twist of his own108 :
g′µν = λ
2gµν (22)
κ′µ = κµ +
∂φ
∂xµ
, φ = log λ. (23)
However, since any reference to the metrical tensor is to be dispensed with at the outset,
one should proceed exclusively from the affine connection. Hence, for instance, according
to the usual mode of derivation of the Riemann-Christoffel tensor, the total variation δAµ
which supposedly affects a given displacement Aµ subjected to parallel transference round
a small circuit C, can be couched by means of (11) in terms of the coefficients Γµνα, as
follows
δAµ =
∮
C
∂Aµ
∂xν
dxν = −
∮
C
ΓµναA
αdxν (24)
and thus by converting the contour integral into a surface integral owing to Stokes’
theorem, Eddington extracts out of it what he calls the generalized Riemann-Christoffel
tensor
∗Bµνσ = −
∂
∂xσ
Γνµ +
∂
∂xν
Γσµ + Γ

ναΓ
α
σµ − ΓσαΓανµ (25)
which mirrors exactly its Riemannian analogue, except for the henceforth metric inde-
pendent status of the Γνµ. In addition to
∗Bµνσ, another scale covariant tensor - or
another “in-tensor” in Eddington’s terminology - is obtained by contraction of the for-
mer, namely ∗Gµν =∗ Bσµνσ. Both
∗Bµνσ and
∗Gµν then play a key role in Eddington’s
theory inasmuch as they are deemed to be “the most fundamental measures of the in-
trinsic structure of the world” and to “take precedence over the gµν which are only
found at a later stage of our theory”109. In a nutshell, as Eddington’s inference roughly
goes, ∗Bµνσ gives rise to
∗Gµν which breaks up into a symmetrical part, Rµν , and an
antisymmetrical part, Fµν ,
∗Gµν = Rµν + Fµν (26)
so that by identifying Rµν with the gravitational potential or the metric and Fµν with
the electromagnetic force, one obtains a bifurcation of geometry and electrodynamics out
of a single world-geometric scale covariant tensor
∗Gµν = gµν + Fµν . (27)
108Note that Eddington’s notation is consistent with Weyl’s, inasmuch as what Weyl denoted φ¯i =
φi− 1λ ∂λ∂xi (cf. above) corresponds now to Eddington’s κ
′
µ = κµ+
∂φ
∂xµ
so that, since dφ = d(log λ) = dλ
λ
,
it is clear by identification that κµ corresponds to −φµ (in Weyl’s notation), or in other words that
Eddington flipped sign in the scale connection.
109[12, p. 215]
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As pointed out by [21], “Eddington’s main goal in this paper [viz. [11]] was to include
matter as an inherent geometrical structure : “What we have sought is not the geometry
of actual space and time, but the geometry of the world-structure which is the common
basis of space and time and things ”([11, p. 121]). By “things” he meant : (1) the
energy-momentum tensor of matter, i.e. the electromagnetic field, (2) the tensor of the
electromagnetic field, and (3) the electric charge-and-current vector. His aim was reached
in the sense that all three quantities were fixed entirely by the connection; they could
no longer be given from the outside.”110 Still the main feature of Eddington’s line of
thought lies in his outright conventional setting of the so-called “natural gauge of the
world”. Since the introduction of an arbitrary metric gµν is required in order to assign
lengths to displacements Aµ by simply stipulating that l2 = gµνAµAν , Eddington avers
that the gµν must be so chosen as to make the lengths of displacements agree with the
lengths resulting from measurements, which can only be guaranteed if “the tensor gµν
which defines the natural gauge is not extraneous, but is a tensor already contained in the
world-geometry”111, namely ∗Gµν . Time is ripe then for fixing the natural gauge, since,
assuming l2 =∗ GµνAµAν , one obtains l2 = RµνAµAν by simply cancelling the antisym-
metrical part of ∗Gµν , so that the gauging equation Rµν = λgµν obviously recommends
itself, while by the same stroke, so to speak, matter is identified with Rµν − 12gµνR, as in
Einstein’s theory. Therefore, as [35] stresses it, “the fundamental field equations of grav-
itation and electromagnetism already appear through mathematical identification with
tensors of world-geometry, and so no appeal need be made to a special action principle
to derive them”112. Still, as will be seen, variational differentiation remains operative
in Eddington’s full-grown world-geometrical framework, though performing a theoreti-
cal function that would henceforth be somewhat deflected from what it used to be at
previous stages.
4.3. “Hamiltonian differentiation” at large
From the vantage point of graphical representation, Eddington could then reassess
the various available action principles that lend themselves to the derivation of the fun-
damental laws of nature, by transposing them in affine field theoretic terms. Since, as
seen earlier, action is traditionally represented by A =
∫
G.
√−gdτ , where G is the
scalar curvature, the straightest way, following Hilbert’s action principle, would have
been seemingly to consider the corresponding generalized form ∗G
√−g as the appropri-
ate option, if only it had been a scale gauge invariant density, or, as Eddington puts
it, an “in-invariant density”, but it is not. When gauge transformations are taken into
account, usual Riemannian invariants may indeed happen to undergo multiplication by a
power of the gauge factor λ and so turn out to be scale covariant quantities with weight,
or, as Eddington dubs them, “co-invariants”113. As it is the case with ∗G
√−g, a natural
alternative would then be to shift to ∗G2
√−g, thus leading to Weyl’s action principle114.
110[21, p. 48]
111[12, p. 219]
112[35, p. 231], my emphasis.
113Eddington’s notions of “co-tensors” and “co-invariants” refer indeed in Weyl’s parlance to the notion
of weight of a tensor, cf. [35, p. 160] for details.
114On Weyl’s action principle, cf. [35, p. 166] for details
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However, from the broader perspective adopted by Eddington115, though there are
no scale gauge invariants, or “in-invariants” as he says, that are function of the gµν and
the κµ, scale gauge invariant densities of the form A = A
√−g may easily be found.
Inasmuch as
√−g becomes multiplied by λ4 when gauge transformation is performed,
it indeed suffices to complement it with any scale covariant quantity which would be
multiplied by λ−4, to obtain a whole range of in-invariant densities, as for instance
(∗G)2
√−g; ∗Gµν .∗Gµν
√−g; ∗Bµνσ.∗Bµνσ
√−g; FµνFµν
√−g. (28)
Assuming then that A = A
√−g is a scale gauge invariant density, either picked out of
these or obtained by linear combination from these, the integral
∫
Adτ taken over a four-
dimensional region of the space-time manifold would be invariant under coordinate- and
gauge-transformations, and therefore would denote an absolute property of the region
itself. Though Weyl thought it defendable to derive from this fact an argument in
favour of the four-dimensional character of the world, since the Maxwell action, viz.∫
FµνF
µν√−gdτ , which he deemed an essential ingredient of any action principle, would
cease to be a pure number in any other number of dimensions116, Eddington dismissed
all concerns pertaining to natural geometry and envisaged the whole question of action
principles from a mere structural point of view.
Couched in Eddington’s affine field theoretic terms, Weyl’s action principle corre-
sponds to the following action density
A
√−g = (∗G2 − αFµνFµν)√−g (29)
where α is a numerical constant. Whereas Weyl considered his own action principle
as “not [necessarily ] realized in nature exactly in this form”117, nevertheless, at least
as Eddington reconstructed his way of thinking, he made the hypothesis that it would
still comply with the principle of stationary action for all variations δgµν , δκµ vanishing
at the boundary of the four-dimensional region, so that the corresponding variational
derivatives would themselves vanish
hA
hgµν
= 0,
hA
hκµ
= 0. (30)
But this time, as a result of the cautious admission of an action principle which Ed-
dington deemed “obviously speculative”118, the vanishing of the variational derivatives
permits no more of any straightforward realist reading. Notwithstanding, “the proce-
dure is instructive as showing the kind of unifying principle that is aimed at according to
one school of thought”119, since equating both variational derivatives to zero allows one
to extract from them some information which may shed light on the way constituents
combine in the making of the action-density. Though Weyl was credited for having made
“an undoubted advance towards the truth” when shifting from ∗G
√−g to ∗G2√−g and
thus making a cosmological curvature term appear, Eddington’s criticism nevertheless
focuses on the artificiality of his action principle.
115Cf. [12, § 88].
116Cf. [35, p. 160] for a detailed account.
117[12, p. 210]
118[12, p. 212].
119[12, p. 210]
28
But the connection [between the gravitational and the electromagnetic compo-
nent ] though reduced to simpler terms is not in any way explained by Weyl’s action
principle. It is obvious that his action as it stands has no deep significance; it is a
mere stringing together of two in-invariants of different forms. To subtract FµνF
µν
from ∗G2 is a fantastic procedure which has no more theoretical justification than
subtracting Eνµ [i.e. the electromagnetic tensor ] from E
ν
µ [i.e. the energy tensor
of matter ]. At the most, we can only regard the assumed form of action A as a
step towards some more natural combination of electromagnetic and gravitational
variables.120
Therefore variational differentiation is to be thought of as a heuristic device which
may help to achieve a better understanding of the way gravitation and electromagnetism
might be pieced together, whether it be used to denounce opaque combinations as in
Weyl’s assumption of a natural gauge or to gain enhanced insight by fathoming the
hidden relations between the various components involved. Accordingly Eddington even
widens the whole technique of it in the line of graphical representation, inasmuch as,
while “this generalised graphical scheme may or may not be helpful to the progress
of our knowledge; we attempt it in the hope that it will render the interconnection of
electromagnetism and gravitational phenomena more intelligible”121. Since “Hamiltonian
differentiation” at large requires that the whole range of significant variations be taken
into account, Eddington now envisages any scalar density K = K
√−g built out of a scale
gauge invariant K as a function of gµν , Fµν , κµ, and their derivatives up to any order,
so that the integral over a four-dimensional region∫
Kdτ (31)
be an invariant. Eddington’s idea is then to apply the method of variational differenti-
ation which proved useful at earlier stages to get in tune with nature’s own bearings, to
world invariants containing electromagnetic variables. By partial integration, he obtains
as previously
δ
∫
Kdτ =
∫
(Pµνδgµν − HµνδFµν +Qµδκµ) dτ (32)
for variations which vanish at the boundary of the region, assuming that, according to
Eddington’s notational conventions as set out in [12, p. 111], the quantities occurring
in the above integral, namely Pµν = Pµν
√−g, Hµν = Hµν√−g and Qµ = Qµ√−g,
respectively correspond to the following variational derivatives
Pµν =
hK
hgµν
, Hµν = − hK
hFµν
, Qµ =
hK
hκµ
. (33)
By piecing together tensors built out of the three main variational derivatives above, Ed-
dington then derives from appropriate assumptions the following mathematical identity
P νµν = −FµνHνσσ −
1
2
(FµνQν + κµQνν) (34)
120[12, p. 212].
121[12, p. 197].
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which can be used to suggest partial identifications with physical magnitudes122 and may
then help to point out a better fitted alternative scale gauge invariant K.
In considering the results of substituting a particular function for K, it has
to be remembered that the equation (100.42) [viz. here (34)] is an identity. We
shall not obtain from it any fresh law connecting gµν and κµ. The final result
after making the substitutions will probably be quite puerile and unworthy of the
powerful general method employed. The interest lies not in the identity itself but
in the general process of which it is a result. We have seen reason to believe that
the process of Hamiltonian differentiation is naturally the process of creation of
a perceptual world around us, so that in this investigation we are discovering the
laws of physics by examining the mode in which the physical world is created. The
identities expressing these laws may be trivial from the mathematical point of view
when separated from the context; but the present mode of derivation gives the clue
to their significance in our experience as fundamental laws of nature.123
At this stage, simplicity should complement perspicuity as a key criterion allowing to
select the scale gauge invariant K. Whereas dismissing Weyl’s action principle, Edding-
ton then calls attention to a heretofore unnoticed regional in-invariant, namely∫ √
−|∗Gµν |dτ (35)
which is “not more irrational than the other in-invariants since these contain
√−g”124,
while this one does not. Eddington names it the “generalised volume” since it is analo-
gous to both the metrical volume and the electromagnetic volume of the region, though
not endowed yet with a definitive physical interpretation. Provided that ∗Gµν is the
building material out of which the world is to be constructed, it is a natural step to look
for the simplest scale gauge invariants that can be derived from it. Still the meaning of
‘simple’ is ambiguous, but, as Eddington suggests, one can “take the order of simplicity
to be the order in which the quantities appear in building the physical world from the
material ∗Gµν”125. In this sense, the generalised volume is simpler than the other scale
gauge invariants, inasmuch as it can be built independently of the process of gauging as it
contains nothing which depends on the gµν as fixed by that means. Though still remain-
ing speculative, this proposal would nevertheless advance our knowledge, since “if this
view is correct, that the invariants which give the ordinary equations adopted in physics
are really approximations to more accurate expressions based on the generalised volume,
it becomes possible to predict the second-order terms which are needed to complete the
equations currently used”126.
5. Concluding remarks : how cracks in world-building call for reverse struc-
tural realism
Eddington’s original claim that “the investigation of the external world in physics
is a quest for structure rather than substance”127 stemmed from the idea that though
122Cf. [12, p. 229-230] for the details of Eddington’s argument.
123[12, p. 230].
124[12, p. 206], the emphasis is Eddington’s.
125[12, p. 232].
126[12, p. 233].
127[12, p. 41].
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“anything permanent tends to become dignified with an attribute of substantiality”128,
any such element of permanence is to be thought of as essentially contributed by the
mind selecting the kind of pattern it is interested in spotting whatever Nature provides
on its own. The mind’s choosing a permanent pattern as the substance of the world
thus boils down to the identification of matter with a suitable “substantial tensor”129,
resulting in imposing laws onto the world. However, Eddington initially resisted the view
of such “selective subjectivism” leading to completely resigning any attempt to grasp
objectivity whatsoever.
Now it appears that a great number of the well-known laws of physics, mechanics
and geometry are implicitly contained in this identification of substance. That is
to say, these laws do not govern the course of events in the objective world, but are
automatically imposed by the mind in selecting what it considers to be substance.
They are identities in the definition of the geometrical character of the pattern
which the mind hunts out. If all the discoveries of physics related to laws of this
kind, we should be forced to admit that physics has nothing to contribute to the
great question of how the world outside us is governed. I am not yet prepared to
admit that. I think that we do, more especially in modern physics, encounter the
genuine laws governing the external world, and are attempting - perhaps rather
unsuccessfully - to grapple with them. But the great exact laws of gravitation,
mechanics and electromagnetism, by which physics has won its high reputation as
an exact science, all appear to belong to the other category; and, when these are set
aside as irrelevant, our claim to have grasped the type of law, or even the meaning
of law, prevailing in the world outside us is reduced to very modest proportions.130
Still, in the late twenties, Eddington would call for such genuine laws which, signifi-
cantly enough, he calls “transcendental laws”, by contrast with “identical laws” on the
one hand, which are “obeyed as mathematical identities in virtue of the way in which the
quantities obeying them are built”131, and “statistical laws” on the other hand, which
reflect uniformity of averages, however uncertain may be the behaviour of the individuals
composing the crowds whose behaviour proves steady and predictable.
If there are any genuine laws of control of the physical world, they must be sought
in the third group - the transcendental laws. The transcendental laws comprise all
those which have not become obvious identities implied in the scheme of world-
building. They are concerned with the particular behaviour of atoms, electrons and
quanta - that is to say, the laws of atomicity of matter, electricity and action. We
seem to be making some progress towards formulating them, but it is clear that the
mind is having a much harder struggle to gain a rational conception of them than
it had with the classical field laws. We have seen that the field laws, especially the
laws of conservation, are indirectly imposed by the mind which has, so to speak,
commanded a plan of world-building to satisfy them. It is a natural suggestion that
the greater difficulty in elucidating the transcendental laws is due to the fact that
we are no longer engaged in recovering from Nature what we have ourselves put in
Nature, but are at last confronted with its own intrinsic system of government. But
I scarcely know what to think. . . . It may be that the laws of atomicity, like the
128[13, p. 242].
129[12, p. 120].
130[10, p. 421], the emphasis is mine.
131[13, p. 244].
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laws of conservation, arise only in the presentation of the world to us and can be
recognised as identities by some extension of the argument we have followed. But it
is perhaps as likely that after we have cleared away all the superadded laws which
arise solely in our mode of apprehension of the world about us, there will be left an
external world developing under genuine laws of control.132
It should be noted that Eddington uses here the phrase “transcendental laws” as
meaning laws that are beyond our grasping them as mathematical identities, though
perhaps only temporarily, hence precisely not in the sense of “transcendental idealism”
as referring to the conditions of possibility of our getting hold of an objective world
constituted in experience. Therefore, though akin to a certain extent to transcendental
idealism, Eddington’s “selective subjectivism” should nevertheless be contrasted with
this philosophical doctrine, inasmuch as allowing ways of approaching independent re-
ality beyond mind’s selected patterns. “Hamiltonian differentiation”, at least at a first
stage, was precisely intended to conjoin this concern for mind-independent objectivity
with mind’s “hunger for permanence”133. However, when hereafter shifting to affine field
theory, Eddington would have to grant his affine field-based physics objective content by
altogether different means since direct reference to the outside world through measure-
ments had been jeopardised by the adoption of the affine connection as the fundamental
quantity, as Pauli already pointed out to Eddington :
The quantities Γµνα cannot be measured directly, but must be obtained from
the directly measured quantities by complicated calculational operations. Nobody
can determine empirically an affine connection for vectors at neighbouring points
if he has not obtained the line element before. Therefore, unlike you and Einstein,
I deem the mathematician’s discovery of the possibility to found a geometry on an
affine connection without a metric as meaningless for physics, in the first place.134
However, in Eddington’s view, world-building was not to be expected to provide more
than “a shadow performance of the drama enacted in the world of experience”135, viz.
a graphical representation whose “success [consists] in the greatest contrast between the
specialised properties of the completed structure [viz. the field laws] and the unspecialised
nature of the basal material [viz. the 256 building blocks which, as explained below, result
from mere structural weaving of relations and thus yield a local numerical measure of
the world-structure].”136 Now Eddington deemed his own world-building enterprise in
the line of the method widely accepted among modern physicists, which, by making up
things of familiar experience such as light and matter out of things “whose nature is
left in suspense”137, eventually brought about a crisis when it came to be realized that
“the linkage to familiar concepts should be through the advanced constructs of physics
and not at the beginning of the alphabet”138. No complete explanation of anything
physical is to be thought of as available whatsoever, insofar as no ultimate reduction
of these abstract concepts in terms of the familiar ones is to be hoped for. Einstein’s
132[13, p. 245].
133[13, p. 242].
134Pauli to Eddington, 20 September 1923, [32, p. 119]. Quoted by [21, p. 52].
135[13, p. 230].
136[13, p. 230], the emphasis is mine.
137[13, p. 248].
138[13, p. 248].
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law for instance presents itself as a statement about certain qualities called potentials
complying with certain differential equations. Still, even in this apparently unambiguous
case, perplexities arise as soon as one pushes further by asking what are potentials.
Eddington would thus later claim in his own peculiar entertaining way, that the method
of physics involves a cyclic scheme akin to the well-known never-ending cumulative rhyme
“The House that Jack built”139, inasmuch as the explanatory process would be doomed to
go round and round endlessly, more or less as follows : this is potential, that was derived
from the space-time interval, that was measured by scales and clocks, that were made
of matter, that embodied mass, momentum and stress, that can be defined in terms
of potentials, that were derived from the space-time interval, and so on and so forth,
endlessly. Though one may be tempted to interrupt the cycle somewhere by saying
that we know what matter is, at least as it occurs in everyday experience, Eddington
emphasizes at this stage that the point of contact of the mind with the physical world
is not very definite, disregarding his earlier attempts to determine it to a certain extent
owing to variational derivatives. Since “the physical entities have a cyclic connection,
and [since] whatever intrinsic nature we attribute to one of them runs as a background
through the whole cycle”140, consciousness is then the only “touchstone of actuality”141
owing to which the actual physical world can be discerned from all other mathematical
worlds in which the same laws of nature hold. As he laid stress on “the potentiality
of being known to the mind as a fundamental objective property of matter, giving it
the status of actuality whether individual consciousness is taking note of it or not”142,
Eddington then seemed to retreat to a rather coarse version of mind-stuff theory, while
claiming structuralism as his professional view.
Insofar as our idea of substance “begins to fade when we analyze it”143, since concrete
daily experienced matter eventually happens to be replaced by some symbolic counter-
part instantiated in a suitable tensor, Eddington indeed envisages mind-stuff as a sub-
stratum that would underlie “mere connectivity of pointer-readings”144, thus providing
world-building with a basis allowing to anchor somehow the scheme of physics in direct
acquaintance.
To put the conclusion crudely - the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. As is often
the way with crude statements, I shall have to explain that by “mind”, I do not
here exactly mean mind and by “stuff” I do not at all mean stuff. Still this is about
as near as we can get to the idea in a simple phrase. The mind-stuff of the world is,
of course, something more general than our own individual conscious minds; but we
may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in consciousness.145
Eddington’s plunging into the “deep waters of philosophy” inasmuch as outlining such
a tentative mind-stuff theory is less supported by some daring confidence in any alleged
swimming capacities, as he himself put it, than it aims at trying “to show that the water
is really deep”146. So as to convince physicists who might find difficult to admit that the
139Cf. [13, 261-263].
140[13, 268].
141[13, 266].
142[13, 267], my emphasis.
143[13, p. 273].
144[13, p. 255].
145[13, p. 276].
146[13, p. 276].
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basal stuff out of which the world is to be built is of a mental nature, Eddington argues
that (1) all our physical knowledge proceeds by inferences from the scarce islands of
conscious awareness in our mental lives, that (2) consciousness is not so well demarcated
and gradually merges into a whole range of less actual and more dispositional mental
states, and eventually that (3) mind-stuff conceived of as the fundamental basso continuo
underlying all such mental states appear as the best potential candidate so as to provide
the intended basis for world-building.
We know that in the mind there are memories not in consciousness at the mo-
ment but capable of being summoned into consciousness. We are vaguely aware that
things we cannot recall are lying somewhere about and may come into the mind
at any moment. Consciousness is not sharply defined, but fades into subconscious-
ness; and beyond that we must postulate something indefinite but yet continuous
with our mental nature. This I take to be world-stuff. We liken it to our conscious
feelings because, now that we are convinced of the formal and symbolic character
of the entities of physics, there is nothing else to liken it to.147
The rationale for such disconcerting mixture of structuralism and mind-stuff theory,
rooted in the world-building enterprise and progressively matured into a philosophical
stance by the end of the decade, is thus to be found in the urge for an overall scheme
which would grant structural knowledge of the external world without renouncing to
account for its having actual substance. Since Eddington’s whole approach consisted,
as previously shown, in starting with the affine connection Γσαβ thought of as given
independently from any underlying metric tensor gµν , the main thrust of his later view
would boil down to a purely structural reading of his earlier affine field theory in order
to derive the whole of relativistic physics out of nothing but the fundamental relation of
likeness of relations. Insofar as a structure can be thought of as a complex of relations
and relata, Eddington would aim at getting rid of relata by framing an “interlocking of
relations” which was meant to mimic148 the way the generalized Riemann-Christoffel
tensor ∗Bµνσ is built by unfolding its inner structure, inasmuch as this scale covariant
tensor, or this “in-tensor” as Eddington calls it, was precisely intended to encapsulate
“the most fundamental measure of the intrinsic structure of the world”149. Assuming
first that the relata, which are presumably to be thought of as the point events of the
space-time manifold, may be distinguished by four monomarks, that relations between
relata can be compared and eventually that there is a relation of likeness between such
relations, so that, when considering any relation between two given relata, one can pick
out two other nearby relata which stand to one another in a like relation, the “ontological
entwining of relations and relata” can thus be achieved, as stressed in [20, p. 233], by
keeping track of the way one relation transforms into another around a closed path
resulting in “a numerical measure of the structure surrounding the initial relatum”150.
From such a “structural interlocking” of relations, the physical features of the world could
then allegedly be obtained. By contracting the above original tensor of the fourth rank
147[13, p. 280].
148Compare for instance Einstein’s geometric presentation of the standard derivation of the Riemann-
Christoffel tensor by means of Stokes’ theorem, as given in [17, p. 75], with Eddington’s diagrammati-
zation of the so-called “structural interlocking of relations” in [14, p. 234].
149[12, p. 215].
150[13, p. 234]
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into one of the second rank, the number of relevant coefficients drops to 16, thus yielding
10 symmetrical coefficients on the one hand, corresponding to Einstein’s potentials gµν ,
from which space, time and “world-curvatures representing the mechanical properties
of matter, viz. momentum, energy, stress, etc.”[13, p. 236]. can be derived, and 6
antisymmetrical ones on the other hand, corresponding to the three components of the
electric intensity and the three components of the magnetic force, from which electric
and magnetic potential, electric charge and current, electromagnetic waves, etc. are
obtained. Inasmuch as relying ultimately on the presumably primitive relation of likeness
between relations, Eddington’s sheerly structural account eventually gives way to mind-
stuff theory.
The only definition we can give of the aspect of the relations chosen for the
criterion of likeness, is that it is the aspect which will ultimately be concerned in
the getting into touch of mind with the physical world. But that is beyond the
province of physics. (. . . ) Let me confess at once that I do not know what I mean
here by “very close together”. As yet space and time have not been built. Perhaps
we might say that only a few of the relata possess relations whose comparability to
the first is definite, and take the definiteness of the comparability as the criterion
of contiguity. I hardly know. The building at this point shows some cracks, but I
think it should not be beyond the resources of the mathematical logician to cement
them up.151
Eddington could not have alluded more transparently to Whitehead and Russell under
this denomination of the presumably allied “mathematical logicians”. As the cracks to be
cemented up appear where physics and mind are supposed to meet, Eddington saw both
Whitehead’s152 and Russell’s work153 on relativity theory as addressing, though from a
different perspective, the same issue of linking physics with the world as given to mind in
familiar experience. Insofar as claiming the fundamental uniformity of nature, Whitehead
indeed dismissed the conception of the space-time manifold as made up of ultimately
unanalyzable space-time points, hence the alleged “casual heterogeneity”154 of space-
time relations in Einstein’s theory, and owing to his method of extensive abstraction, he
set out to build the space-time manifold out of a “continuum of events” so as to account
for the required underlying basis of uniformity.
Nature presents itself to us as essentially a becoming, and any limited portion
of nature which preserves most completely such concreteness as attaches to nature
itself is also a becoming and is what I call an event. By this I do not mean a bare
portion of space-time. Such a concept is a further abstraction. I mean a part of the
becomingness of nature, coloured with all the hues of its content. Thus nature is
a becomingness of events which are mutually significant so as to form a systematic
structure. We express the character of the systematic structure of events in space
and time. Thus space and time are abstractions from this structure.155
Following Whitehead, Russell would also make extensive use of mathematical logic
so as to analyze the ultimate objects of physical theory as logical constructions out of
events.
151[13, p. 232-233].
152Cf. [47].
153Cf. [34].
154[47, Preface, p. v].
155[47, p. 21].
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We shall find . . . that the objects which are mathematically primitive in physics,
such as electrons, protons, and points in space-time, are all logically complex struc-
tures composed of entities which are metaphysically more primitive, which may be
conveniently called “events”. It is a matter for mathematical logic to show how to
construct, out of these, the objects required by the mathematical physicist.156
However, his logical analysis openly aimed at bridging the gap between physics on
the one hand and the mass of percepts on the other hand, that Eddington’s definition of
matter by identification with a well-behaved tensor had inevitably brought about.
Approximately, matter as conceived by common sense is conserved; wherever
it appears to be destroyed or created, we can find ways of explaining away this
appearance. Hence, as an ideal suggested by empirical facts, we adopt the view
that matter is indestructible. We then turn round, and beginning from the formula
for interval we construct a mathematical quantity which is indestructible. This,
we say, we shall call “matter”; and no harm comes of our doing so. But whenever
we take a step of this sort, we widen the gulf between mathematical physics and
observation, and increase the problem of building a bridge between them.157
Whereas he adopted a view of inferential knowledge according to which, as in Russell’s
theory of perception, we would reconstruct the world of physics out of the informative
content entering our consciousness “in the form of messages transmitted along the nerves
(. . . ) as a paleontologist reconstructs an extinct monster from its footprint”158, Edding-
ton considered Whitehead’s approach as only apparently “diametrically opposed” to his,
and inasmuch as it involved “a certain amount of working backwards”, he envisaged it as
a “tunnelling” from the opposite side of the mountain “to meet his less-philosophically
minded colleagues”159. As variational derivatives eventually came to be divested of their
original role as keeping the mind in step with nature, after graphical representation had
tipped the scale of “Hamiltonian differentiation” in the sense of a heuristic device, Ed-
dington would thus turn to mind-stuff to the same purpose, since “the word ‘stuff’ has
reference to the function it has to perform as a basis of world-building and does not
imply any modified view of its nature”160.
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